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Software Producers’ Choice on Compatibility with Hardware 
  
Sang-Yong Tom Lee 
National University of Singapore                                                                         
    
 
Abstract 
 
Software products do not provide consumption benefit unless a hardware product is installed in 
advance. In the market with this software – hardware relationship, a software producer 
sometimes finds that it is profitable to make its product compatible with only a certain 
hardware product.  This incompatibility decision is considered as a vertical foreclosure.  The 
conditions under which vertical merger and foreclosure occur in equilibrium are analyzed. We 
find that the welfare reducing foreclosure arises in equilibrium even without the credible 
commitment of foreclosure decision.     
 
Key Words: Compatibility Decision, Hardware-Software, Base–Supplemental Goods, 
Vertical Foreclosure 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Software products do not provide consumption benefits unless some other products are 
purchased in advance and used in conjunction.  For example, consumers need to have hardware 
products.  Some software products like operating system (OS) are also essential and 
prerequisite to other application software products.  In this complementary relationship, we 
define ‘base good’ as one of the two complementary goods that must be purchased and 
installed prior to use application software products. Examples are hardware and OS.  We also 
define ‘supplemental good’ as the other complementary good that provides consumption 
benefit when only used in conjunction with a base good. Any application software is a 
supplemental good.  A base good may give consumption benefit without a specific 
supplemental good but a supplemental good always requires a base good.   
 
An important property of many goods in the base-supplemental relationship is that the base 
good is typically much less substitutable than the supplemental good because of high switching 
costs. For instance, a consumer can pick Netscape Navigator or Internet Explorer as a default 
web-browser and switch from one to the other one easily.  Changing computers from a PC (and 
Windows operating system) to a Mackintosh is, however, more problematic. We analyze a 
market with two complementary goods in ‘base-supplemental’ relation in this paper and the 
canonical example is hardware-software products. 
 
The studies on the markets with two related products have focused on the monopoly reasons 
for vertical control.  The issues in the studies are including the anti-competitive effects of 
vertical mergers, the possibilities of vertical foreclosure, and the welfare effect of vertical 
integration.  While Chicago school argued that there is no monopoly reason for vertical 
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integration1, many recent authors like Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (OSS) (1990), Choi and 
Yi(1997) showed that anti-competitive vertical merger or vertical foreclosure can occur as an 
equilibrium. 
 
When they consider the vertically related industries, they focus on the upstream-downstream 
relationship, so the upstream firms produce intermediate goods and the downstream firms 
produce final goods with the upstream firms’ intermediate goods.  Therefore, no consumers’ 
choices are directly involved in this vertical relationship.  This paper, contrarily, considers a 
vertically related industry where the firms’ products are sold directly to consumers.  Therefore, 
consumers choose both components of the complementary goods. 
 
Many works of Economides (Economides and Salop(1992), Economides(1994), and 
Economides(1997))are analyzing the market with two complementary goods.  They are 
characterized by bundling purchase of two simple complementary goods, like bolt and nut.  So, 
there is no consideration in purchasing timing or in difference of substitutability between base 
goods and supplemental goods in their models.  Church and Gandal(1997) assume a timing 
structure where consumers purchase hardware first, then software.  In this sense, this paper is 
following their setting.  However, they do not capture the fact that hardware is less 
substitutable than software. 
 
When a firm produces both hardware and software products, sometimes it makes its software 
products incompatible against the rival firms’ hardware.  This is called vertical foreclosure.  
For example, Nintendo and Sony do not have compatibility to each other.  In this paper, we 
consider the possibility of vertical foreclosure and its welfare effect.  We analyze the 
conditions that make vertical foreclosure be an equilibrium outcome. We find that there is 
more incentive for vertical foreclosure when the degree of substitutability is high and market 
share of foreclosing product is small.  We also find that even without the credible commitment 
of foreclosure decision, the welfare reducing foreclosure may arise. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  We describe the basic model in section 2.  The equilibrium 
outcomes of the model are explained in section 3, and the welfare effect of integration and 
foreclosure are discussed in section 4.  In section 5, we mention the possible extension of the 
model followed by conclusion and summary. 
 
 
2.  Model 
 
2.1. Firms 
 
Two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) are producing base goods (hardware) B1 and B2, and two firms 
(firm 3 and firm 4) are producing supplemental goods (software) S1 and S2 respectively. A base 
good and a supplemental good are, of course, complementary.  Base goods firms and 
supplemental goods firms have constant marginal production cost, mcB and mcS, respectively. 
 All fixed costs are sunk. 
 
                         
1 see Tirole(1988) and Ordover, Saloner, and Salop(1990) 
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Each pair of firms are under price competition.  The price of base goods B1 and B2 are denoted 
to be q1 and q2, and the supplemental goods S1 and S2 are denoted to be p1 and p2, respectively. 
 We also denote the market share of B1 to be ω and the market share of B2 to be 1-ω. 
 
We are assuming that the compatibility decisions are on supplemental good firms (firm 3 and 
firm 4). If either of two supplemental good firms makes its good compatible only with one of 
the base goods, then that behavior is considered as a foreclosure against the other base good. 
The compatibility structure will be one of the three cases; 1) full compatibility, 2) partial 
foreclosure, and 3) parallel foreclosure.  We also assume that it is costless to change the 
compatibility structure and the ownership structure.   
 
2.2. Consumers  
 
There are N consumers in the market, and N is normalized to 1.  We assume that a consumer 
needs to have one unit of base good to consume supplemental goods.  Consumers’ preferences 
are identical.  We denote the demand of S1 with base B1 and B2 to be S11 and S21 respectively 
and the demand of S2 with base B1 and B2 to be S12 and S22. 
 
If a consumer has base good Bi (i=1,2) and both S1 and S2 are compatible with Bi, then her 
utility function is      
)2(
2
1)(),,,( 21
2
2
2
12121 iiiiiiiiii SSSSSSBhXSSBXU γββαα ++−+++=   (1) 
where X is the outside good and h(B) is the stand-alone benefit of base good. B is defined over 
non-negative integer with h(0)=0, h(1)>0, and h(1)≥h(k) for all integer k. Note that we assume 
the utility function is separable in X, the outside good and the base good.  We also assume that 
all coefficients are positive, and β>γ.2  The budget constraint of consumers with base good Bi 
is: 
2,1,2211 ==+++ iISpSpBqX iiii       (2)  
      
 
Maximization of (1) subject to (2) yields demand equations: 
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Note that h(B*)=h(1) is a constant. 
 
If a consumer already has a durable base good before the maximization, then her consumption 
benefit (CB) with that base good is 
                         
2 This can be interpreted as “an increase in the price of all differentiated goods reduces 
the demand for each good.”  This restriction is quite common in oligopoly models.  
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Now, if Bi and Sj are not compatible, then Sj does not give any consumption benefit to the 
consumers with Bi, so the utility function will not include the terms with incompatible good Sj. 
 Therefore, when a consumer has Bi and only Si is compatible with it, her utility function and 
budget constraint will be 
2
2
1ˆ)()ˆ,,(ˆ iiiiiiii SSBhXSBXU βα −++=       (1)’ 
2,1,ˆ1 ==++ iISpBqX iiii        (2)’ 
We denote iSˆ  to be the supplemental good Si when Sj is not compatible with the base good Bi. 
 The demand function and the realized consumer’s surplus in this case are  
jiSepdS ijiii ≠=−= ,0ˆ,ˆ        
(3)’ 
where d≡α/β, and e≡1/β.3 
2****** ˆ
2
1)()ˆ,,(ˆ iiiiiiii SBqBhISBXUCS β+−+==      (4)’ 
Again, if we drop the third term of the right hand side, then we have consumption benefit of a 
consumer who has a base good ex ante: 
2***** ˆ
2
1)()ˆ,,(ˆ iiiiii SBhISBXUCS β++==        (5)’ 
 
Since equation (3) or (3)’ is the individual’s demand function and consumers are identical, we 
can get the market demand function by simply multiplying (3) or (3)’ by the number of 
consumers with that particular base good. 
 
2.3. Setting of the game 
 
We model the three-stage game.  Before the beginning of the game, consumers already 
purchased and installed the base goods, and the market shares are exogenously given.  We 
assume that the initial industrial structure is independent ownership with full compatibility.  In 
the first stage, observing the initial value of ω (we denote it to be ω0), firms decide the 
compatibility and ownership structures.  In the second stage, firm 1 and firm 2 set the prices of 
base goods simultaneously, and consumers can switch their base goods.  If a consumer chooses 
to switch it, she needs to purchase a new base good, but if she decides to stay with the previous 
base good, she pays nothing.  Therefore, the price of the base good works as switching costs.  
In the final stage, firm 3 and firm 4 set the price of supplemental goods simultaneously, and 
consumers purchase them.     
 
2.4. Three subgames 
 
                         
3 To compare the profits and consumer surplus in the next chapter, it is very helpful to 
express d and e in terms of a, b, and c as follows: 
b
cbe
b
cbad
22
,)( −=+= . 
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The equilibrium outcomes of this game can be derived by backward induction.  So, we start 
with the final stage.  Since the supplemental goods’ prices are not affected by the ownership 
structure, we calculate the profits of firms under the three different compatibility structures.   
 
2.4.1. Full compatibility 
 
If firm 3 and firm 4 make their products compatible both with B1 and B2, then the objective 
functions of firm 3 and firm 4 will be  
 
π3 = p1 (ωS11+(1-ω)S21)                                                                
π4 = p2 (ωS12+(1-ω)S22)                          
 
By solving the first order conditions, the optimal prices, profits and consumption benefits are 
obtained: 
2
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2.4.2. Partial foreclosure 
 
When one of the two supplemental good firms (say firm 3) makes its good(S1) be compatible 
with only one of the two base goods(say B1), so forecloses against B2, then the firms’ objective 
functions will be 
 
π3 = p1 (ωS11+(1-ω)S^21) = p1ωS11      
π4 = p2 (ωS12+(1-ω)S^22)                          
 
 
The optimal prices and profits are 
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      (7)      
 
CB1part = a2(8b5+4b4ωc+4b4c+16b3ωc2+b3ω2c2-15c2b3+5b2ω2c3+2b2ωc3-7b2c3 
                                   +9bω2c4-16c4ωb+7c4b+3c5-6c5ω+3c5ω2) / 2b(b-c)(3ωc2+4b2-4c2)2 
CB2part= a2(b+c)(2b2+ωbc+2ωc2-2c2)2 / b(b-c)(3ωc2+4b2-4c2)2 
         
 
Note that prices are higher under partial foreclosure than under full compatibility, i.e., p2part> 
p1part >pfuil.  This is because firm 4 becomes, in a sense, a monopolist for the consumers with 
B2 after the foreclosure.  Higher p2 causes higher p1 because prices are strategic complements 
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in the Bertrand game.  Firm 4 will always be better off by the foreclosure of firm 3 against B2, 
i.e., π4part>π4full, while we can not unambiguously determine whether or not firm 3 will be 
better.  Finally, CB1part  > CB2part, and this is because consumers with B2 can not enjoy the 
product diversity of supplemental goods. 
 
2.4.3. Parallel foreclosure 
 
If firm 4 also makes its product (S2) be compatible only with B2 under the partial foreclosure, 
then it will be changed into the parallel foreclosure.  The objective functions will be  
 
111211113 Sˆp  )Sˆ)-(1Sˆ(p  ωωωπ =+=  
222221224 Sˆ)1(p  )Sˆ)-(1Sˆ(p  ωωωπ −=+=  
 
 
The optimal prices and profits are 
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Under parallel foreclosure, prices get even higher than under partial foreclosure, because firm 
3 and firm 4 are like two independent monopolists.  However, we cannot unambiguously say 
whether firm 3 and firm 4 are better off from partial foreclosure.   
 
 
3. Equilibrium outcome 
 
Now, we need to analyze the base good firms’ pricing rule.  Since B1 and B2 are homogenous, 
as long as both goods give the same consumption benefit, consumers have no incentive to 
switch their base goods.  Therefore, if the compatibility structure is full compatibility or 
parallel foreclosure, nothing will happen in the second stage.  Under partial compatibility, 
however, the consumption benefits from B1 and B2 are different (CB1>CB2).  If that difference 
is larger than the price of B1, then consumers with base good B2 purchase B1 and switch their 
base goods. 
 
The lowest possible price of B1 is the marginal cost (mcB).  Therefore, we can consider two 
cases: 1) marginal cost is relatively low (mcB<CB1part-CB2part ), and 2) marginal cost is 
relatively high (mcB≥CB1part-CB2part).  
 
3.1.  High switching cost case 
 
When mcB ≥CB1part-CB2part, consumers always stay with their current base goods and base good 
firms don’t get any additional profits in the second stage.  This fact makes two notable points. 
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 First of all, the initial market share ω0 does not change till the end of the game.  Second of all, 
it is meaningless to consider the joint profits of base good firm and supplemental firm good.  
Therefore, ownership structure is not a concern in this case. We analyze the equilibrium 
outcome of compatibility structure, which is decided by two supplemental good firms. 
 
Firm 3 will make its product be compatible only with B1, if π3part>π3full.  Otherwise, it will make 
its good be compatible with both B1 and B2.  From (6) and (7), we can compare the profits of 
two cases. 
 
π3part>π3full   iff 
 
016321668171644 64224533624422426252 >−+−−+++−−− bbcbcbcbccbcbcbccbc ωωωωωωωω  
 
 
To understand the economic meaning of this inequality, we divide above inequality by b6.  
Then we have 
016321668171644 2453642426252 >−+−−+++−−− ηηωηωηωηωηωηηωηωηω   (9) 
 
where η≡c/b.  Note that η is the degree of substitutability of two supplemental goods, and since 
b>c≥0, η is between zero and one.(η∈[0,1))  If η is equal to zero, two supplemental goods are 
independent, and if η is near 1, then two goods are close substitutes. 
 
The inequality (9) cannot be determined unambiguously.  It may be true with some 
combinations of ω and η.  Since ω∈[0,1] and η∈[0,1), we can indicate the combinations of ω 
and η to make (8) true in <figure 1>.  In <figure 1>, the horizontal axis is ω and the vertical axis 
is η.  There is a downward sloping curve which starts at (0, 1)  and ends at around (1, .9).  The 
area above that curve indicates the combinations of ω and η to hold the inequality (8).  In other 
words, if (ω, η) is in that area, firm 3 will choose to foreclose against B2 and make its product 
be compatible only with B1.  If (ω, η) is below that curve, then firm 3 will make S1 be 
compatible with both B1 and B2.4  
 
We observe that the area for the partial foreclosure is with high η, the degree of substitutability. 
 One can also see that area gets wider as ω, the market share of B1 bigger.  Therefore, we say 
that there are more incentives for partial foreclosure with higher degree of substitutability and 
with bigger market share of B1. 
 
What is the intuition behind this story?  In other words, what is the source of the incentives for 
the foreclosure.  If firm 3 forecloses against B2, then it completely loses the customers with B2. 
We call this abandon effect.  However, once it forecloses, firm 4 becomes a monopolist for the 
consumers with B2, and it has an incentive to raise the price of S2.  Since p1 and p2 are strategic 
complements, firm 3's best response to the firm 4's behavior is to raise p1, but lower than p2. 
(recall that p2part> p1part >pfull).  If S1 and S2 are close substitutes, consumers with base good B1 
                         
4 In fact, we only need to look at the area for ω ∈[1/2, 1].  Because a supplemental 
firm , if it has choice, forecloses not against the base good with larger market share but against 
smaller market share. 
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are willing to buy more S1 than S2.  We call this substitution effect.  The latter effect will 
dominate the former effect when S1 and S2 are close substitutes or when the market share of B1 
is large. 
 
Now, under the partial foreclosure structure, we need to check whether firm 4 has an incentive 
to foreclose against B1.  This is called counter foreclosure.  Firm 4 will do so if π4paral  > π4part. 
 By the same way as we did above, we get 
  
π4paral > π4part       iff 
0164082482843713135 234523454252 >−++−−−−++−− ηηηηωηωηωηωηηωηω       (10) 
 
The combinations of (ω,η) to hold this inequality are indicated in <figure 1>.  They are the area 
above the upward sloping curve which starts at about (0, 0.74) and ends at (1, 0). 
 
Again, as the degree of substitutability is higher and the market share of B2, (1-ω) is bigger, 
counter foreclosure is more likely to occur.  By foreclosing, firm 4 will lose all the sales to the 
consumers with base good B1.  However, that  amount of sales is small when ω is small or when 
the degree of substitutability is high.   
 
From the two inequalities (9) and (10), we can find the equilibrium compatibility structure 
under given combination of market share and degree of substitutability.  If the combinations of 
(ω,η) are below the downward sloping curve, then the equilibrium compatibility structure will 
be full compatibility.  If the combinations of (ω,η) are above the downward sloping curve but 
below the upward sloping curve, then partial foreclosure will be the equilibrium outcome.  If 
combinations of (ω,η) are above both curves, then parallel foreclosure is the equilibrium 
outcome.  
 
<Proposition 1> The closer substitutes are the two supplemental goods, the more 
incentives does a firm have for foreclosure against one base good.  The equilibrium 
compatibility structure depends on the given combinations of market share and degree 
of substitutability of two supplemental goods as indicated in <Figure 1>  
 
The downward sloping curve represents (9) and the upward sloping curve represents (10).  The 
curves are drawn in GAUSS by numerically changing the combination value of (ω, η).  No 
further proof is required in this proposition, but we can look at some specific values to see 
whether it works.  For example, if ω=0, then the left hand side of (9) becomes –16(η2-1)2 < 0. 
 Therefore, the equilibrium structure is full compatibility. If ω=1, then the left hand side of (9) 
becomes 2η3+3η2-4, which is positive when η is between 0.9 and 1.  In this manner, we 
construct the downward slopping curve in <Figure 1> 
 
3.2. Low switching cost case  
 
In the high switching cost case, π1 and π2 are always zero, because no consumers are buing the 
additional base good. However, in the low switching cost case, a consumer may purchase a 
new base good if the consumption benefits from the two base goods are different because a 
base good price may be lower than the consumption benefits difference. Recall two 
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consumption benefits are different only under partial compatibility.  Therefore, if 
mcB<CB1part-CB2part, firm 1 charges the price of B1 to be slightly lower than the difference, and 
makes consumers with B2 switch to B1.  In this case, q1* = CB1part-CB2part-ε, where ε is small 
enough positive number.  Hence, π1part = (1-ω)(CB1part-CB2part-ε-mcB) and π2part = 0, because 
1-ω portion of consumers purchase B1 at price q1*.  
 
However, firm 1 does not have the compatibility choice by itself, so firm 3 should be involved 
in that structural change.  Firm 3 may agree to make S1 be compatible only with B1 if the joint 
profit of firm 1 and firm 3 under partial foreclosure is larger than firm 3's profit under full 
compatibility, even though its own profit under partial foreclosure is not larger.  Therefore, by 
explicitly considering the ownership structure with compatibility structure, we may have a 
different equilibrium outcome.  Firm 1 and firm 3 will integrate and foreclose against B2, if 
 
π1part + π3part(ω=1) > π3full(ω=ω0).      (11) 
 
It is easy to see that there is stronger incentive in the low switching cost case than in the high 
switching cost case.  In fact, the above inequality holds everywhere.  This is because 
π3part(ω=1) = π3full(ω=ω0) and π1part >0.  Hence, in low switching cost case, partial integration 
and foreclosure always occur. 
 
Now, we consider the possibility of counter foreclosure.  If firm 4 merges with firm 2 and 
forecloses against B1, then industrial structure will go back to symmetric structure.  Since 
CS1paral = CS2paral, consumers would not change from the previous choice of the base goods and 
q1= q2=π1=π2=0.  Therefore, if firm 4's profit π4paral with initial market share ω0 is greater than 
π4part with ω=1, then counter merger and counter foreclosure will occur. 
 
π4paral (ω=ω0) > π4part (ω=1)     iff    04343 2323 >+−+−+− ηηηωωηωη  (12) 
 
This inequality is true for the area above the curve in <Figure 2>, which looks like a 45-degree 
line.  Therefore, we can conclude that if (ω, η) is above the curve in <Figure 2>, then parallel 
integration and foreclosure is the equilibrium outcome, and if (ω, η) is below that curve, then 
partial integration and foreclosure is the equilibrium outcome.  The intuition for the counter 
foreclosure is the same as in the high switching cost case. 
             
  
<Proposition 2>  If (ω, η) is above the curve in <Figure 2>, then parallel integration and 
foreclosure will be the equilibrium outcome and if (ω, η) is below that curve, then partial 
integration and foreclosure will be the equilibrium outcome.  In the partial integration 
outcome, however, firm 1 will sweep all the consumers and the market share will be 
changed into ω=1. The optimal price of B1 in this case is CS1part-CS2part- ε .   
 
 
Proof:  First, we need to show that at least partial foreclosure will always occur, i.e., π1part+ 
π3part (ω=1) - π3full (ω=ω0)>0. Since π1part+ π3part (ω=1) - π3full 
(ω=ω0)= 2222
22222
)434(2
)2)(1(
ccbb
ccbcba
−+
−++−
ω
ωω , and it is always positive, at least partial foreclosure 
  
485 
occurs.  Now, parallel foreclosure arises in equilibrium when the inequality (12) holds.  The 
downward sloping curve is drawn in GAUSS by numerically changing the combination value 
of (ω, η). When the combination of (ω, η) is in the area above this curve, then the inequality 
(12) is true and the equilibrium structure is parallel foreclosure.  Otherwise, partial foreclosure 
is the equilibrium ownership structure. <Q.E.D.> 
 
 
4. Welfare Effects  
 
The social welfare is defined as the sum of the profits of firms and consumers’ surplus.  By 
comparing social welfare in three cases, we can conclude that Welfarefull > Welfarepart > 
Welfareparal.  It is interesting to note that firm 2 and firm 4 are not hurt by partial foreclosure at 
all.  Firm 4 is even better off by it.  All burdens of welfare loss are on consumers.   
 
<Proposition 3> Integration and foreclosure causes welfare loss to the society.   Welfare is 
the best under full compatibility, and the worst under the parallel foreclosure. Partial 
foreclosure is between the two.  
 
proof : We need to show 1) Welfarefull - Welfarepart > 0, and 2) Welfarepart - Welfareparal > 0.  
 
1) sign[Welfarefull - Welfarepart] = sign [20η 4(1-η )ω 2 + 5η 6 ω 2 +(60η 2-44η 3-43η 4+46η5 
-15 η6)ω  + 48-6η  +12η 6+16η 4-76η 2+40η 3-24η 5].  Let the term in parenthesis of the right 
hand side be  Θ(ω ,η).  Since Θ is a quadratic function where ω is between 0 and 1, Θ(ω ,η) is 
positive if  Θ(0,η )>0, Θ(1 ,η)>0, and Θ(ωm,η) >0, where ωm is the argument of  min Θ(ω ,η). 
 However, since ωm is greater than 1 and we don’t need to check the sign of Θ(ω m,η). We see 
that the sign [Θ(ω ,η)] = sign [-3η 3+9η 2-16η+12].  The derivative of -3η 3+9η 2-16η +12 
with respect to η is -9η 2+18η -16, which is always negative when 0<η < 1.  This means it is 
monotonically decreasing function of η between 0 and 1. Since -3η 3+9η 2-16η +12 = 2 when 
η =1, the sign of -3η3+9η 2-16η +12 is positive. By the same procedure, we see that the sign 
[Θ(1, η )] = sign [-2η 3+2η2-5η +6] is positive. Therefore, Welfarefull - Welfarepart > 0. 
 
2) sign [Welfarepart - Welfareparal ] = sign [20η 4(1-η )ω 2 + (53η 5-51η 4-44η 3+60η2)ω  - 
36η5+28η4+52η3-76η 2-16η +48].  Let the term in the parenthesis of the right hand side be 
Ξ(ω , η).  Since Ξ is a quadratic function of ω which is between 0 and 1, Ξ(ω ,η ) is positive if 
 (0, η)>0,  (1, η)>0, and  (ω m, η)>0, where ω m is the argument of  min (ω , η).  However, since 
ωm is greater than 1, we do not need to check the sign of Ξ(ω m, η).  It is easy to see that sign [Ξ 
(0, η)] = sign [9η2-16η +12] >0.  Sign [Ξ(1, η)] is equal to sign [-3η 3+9η 2-16η +12], which 
we already show the positive sign in 1).  Therefore, Welfarepart - Welfareparal > 0.    (Q.E.D.) 
 
In our setting, we find two remarkable points that depart from OSS (1990) and other vertical 
foreclosure literatures.  First, contrary to other ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’ results, partial 
foreclosure (and integration) does not hurt the rival firm’s profit even though it reduces social 
welfare.  Second, even without the ability of commitment, the welfare reducing foreclosure 
may arise.  We need to look at the details of the second point.   
 
We’ve showed that partial foreclosure always occurs in the low switching cost case.  When 
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firm 1 and firm 3 announce the merger and foreclosure decision in the first stage, then 
consumers with base good B2 will purchase base good B1 in the second stage.  However, 
suppose some consumers with B2 do not switch to B1 in the second stage for some reason.  
Then, in the final stage, firm 3 may have an incentive to renege on its foreclosure commitment 
and supply S1 to these consumers. Knowing this, consumers may not purchase and switch to 
B1. 
 
This commitment problem has been a big issue of vertical foreclosure literatures since 
OSS(1990).5  They show that anticompetitive vertical integration can arise in equilibrium if the 
vertically integrated firm can commit not to sell its input to the unintegrated downstream firm. 
 It has been argued that OSS’s result breaks down if the vertically integrated firm cannot make 
the credible commitment because the integrated firm has a strong incentive to renege on its 
price commitment and undercut the unintegrated rival’s price. 
 
If we assume that the firms cannot commit to foreclose against the unintegrated rival firm, then 
our equilibrium ownership structure in Figure 2.2 is no longer valid.  However, if the initial 
market share and the degree of substitutability are in the partial foreclosure area of the Figure 
2.1, then without the ability of commitment, firm 3 forecloses against B2 anyway.  If the initial 
market share and the degree of substitutability are not in this area, then there is no incentive for 
firm 3 to foreclose.  Therefore, we can say that even without credible commitment, welfare 
reducing foreclosure may happen if the market share of foreclosing product is small and the 
degree of substitutability is high. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
We consider a market with two complementary goods, a ‘base good’(hardware) and a 
‘supplemental’ good (software).  With the assumption that there are two base good firms and 
two supplemental good firms, we analyze the conditions that make vertical integration and 
incompatibility decision equilibrium outcomes. Incompatibility decision can be considered as 
a vertical foreclosure.  We find that there are more incentives for partial foreclosure when the 
degree of substitutability of two competing supplemental goods (software products) is high and 
market share of foreclosing product is small.  We also find that even without a credible 
commitment of foreclosure decision, the welfare reducing foreclosure may arise. 
 
Our results may not be sensitive to the restriction on a consumer’s initial purchase of a base 
good.  This needs to be examined in a dynamic game that allows a certain portion of consumers 
repurchase base goods when their durabilities wear out.  In this case, we need to consider the 
firm’s present value of future profits.  The equilibrium ownership structures may be different. 
 This remains as an area for future study 
 
 
                         
5 If we do not want to worry about the commitment problem, then as Church and 
Gandal (1997) do, we can assume that the compatibility choice is not reversible because it is 
too costly, or that a firm has an incentive to build its ‘reputation’ over time. 
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<Figure 1> Equilibrium Outcome under High Switching Cost 
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<Figure 2> Equilibrium Outcome under Low Switching Cost 
 
 
